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Abstract
The ﬁnancial industry has recently seen a push away from structured products and
towards transparency. The trend is to decompose products, such that customers understand
each component as well as its price. Yet the enormous annuity market combining investment
and longevity has been almost untouched by this development.
We suggest a simple decomposed annuity structure that enables cost transparency and
could be linked to any investment fund. It has several attractive features: (i) it works for
any heterogeneous group; (ii) participants can leave before death without ﬁnancial penalty;
and (iii) participants have complete freedom over their own investment strategy.
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1 Introduction
Over 40% of all private industry workers in the U.S. are saving for their retirement through a
deﬁned contribution plan (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012, Table 2). While the overall value
of assets held in these plans is immense, being approximately $10 trillion in the U.S. in 2012
(Towers Watson, 2013), individuals’ asset values can be small. For example, the median asset
value held by those age 55 or older in funds run by Vanguard, a large mutual fund company, was
around $60000 in 2011 (Vanguard, 2012). A similar magnitude of savings is reported in (Poterba
et al., 2011, Table 2) for people age 65 to 69 in the year 2008. With the lifetime guaranteed
income oﬀered by Social Security and deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans declining relative to pre-
retirement income (Webb, 2011), millions of individuals must maximize their retirement income
arising from their deﬁned contribution plan savings. They cannot aﬀord to pay unnecessary
charges and fees.
Yet in the life annuity contract, which economic theory recommends as a signiﬁcant com-
ponent of the optimal retirement investment strategy (Yaari 1965, Davidoﬀ et al. 2005), costs
are hidden from the customer (Blake 1999, Stewart 2007). We argue that cost transparency in
life annuities is very important, due to the generally irreversible and very long-term nature of
these contracts, which potentially involves all of the life savings of individuals. Consumers have
no idea if annuity prices are fair, or if insurance companies are either making excessive proﬁts
or are grossly ineﬃcient (Carlin 2009, Del Guercio and Reuter 2013, Glode et al. 2012). We
present a solution to these diﬃculties. We propose a decomposed annuity structure that could
be linked to any investment and that enables all costs to be disclosed. Our aim is to improve
the transparency of the ﬁnancial and insurance products that are oﬀered to retirees. Greater
transparency may also improve the ﬁnancial regulation of these products (Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
2013).
In the classical life annuity contract, called a ﬁxed-payout life annuity1, the annuitant is
charged a single (i.e. lump sum) premium and in exchange receives a ﬁxed income stream for
life. The anticipated ongoing costs are not disclosed explicitly to the potential annuitant. (Some
1More speciﬁcally, it is a single premium immediate level annuity written on a single life.The annuity overlay fund 3
insurance companies may charge explicitly for sales commission and the initial administration
costs of setting up the annuity contract.) All the potential annuitant knows is the amount of
lifetime income that her lump-sum retirement savings will buy. To evaluate the worth of the
annuity compared to other investments, the customer must make a number of sophisticated
assumptions and complicated calculations. Generally, it is an irreversible contract, so the cus-
tomer must trust that the insurance company will continue to pay the income stream over her
future lifetime, which may be for decades. It is notable that, worldwide, relatively few people
voluntarily annuitize their retirement wealth2 (Brown 2007, Mitchell and Piggott 2011).
The main reason for the opacity of life annuity contracts is that investment risk is combined
with mortality risk and costs are not disclosed by the insurance company. As a consequence,
life annuities are not comparable on either an individual risk component basis or on a cost
basis. This intransparency has generated a body of literature that questions if annuities oﬀer
value-for-money to the annuitant (for example, Mitchell et al. 1999, Cannon and Tonks 2009).
Typically, the authors calculate the expected value of a ﬁxed-payout life annuity, using what
they believe to be a reasonable calculation basis. Their estimated prices are then compared
to those quoted in the market by insurance companies. The diﬀerence in the values gives an
indication of the amount of costs and proﬁt expected by the insurance companies during the
contract period.
Unsurprisingly, given the sensitivity of annuity prices to the mortality and investment return
assumptions, there is a wide variation in the results. For example, in Mitchell et al. (1999,
Table 3) the annuity prices quoted by insurance companies in the U.S. in 1995 are between
74% and 94% of the authors’ calculated expected values. A similar range is observed in the
U.K. by Cannon and Tonks (2009). Without more information from insurance companies
concerning their annuity calculation basis, we can only hypothesize about the reasons for the
range of results. It may be due to the insurance companies assuming a diﬀerent calculation basis
than in the studies. For example, the insurance companies may invest in riskier assets than
those assumed in the studies, or they may assume that annuitants live longer. It may be due
2A phenomenon referred to as the annuity puzzle. Recent reviews of the literature on the annuity puzzle can
be found in Brown (2009) and Lown and Robb (2011).The annuity overlay fund 4
to insurance companies’ costs, proﬁt and risk capital requirements, or it may be competitive
reasons. Without more information it is diﬃcult to draw strong conclusions concerning the
value-for-money of annuities.
The lack of information also means that is not clear if annuity prices quoted by insurance
companies are competitive, as they can vary signiﬁcantly across companies (Mitchell et al.
1999, Cannon and Tonks 2009). Furthermore, even if the annuity market is competitive, it
does not follow that consumers have low costs (Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001). For example, in the
related mutual fund market, fees can be too high (e.g., see Crespo 2009 for the Spanish mutual
fund market, and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verd´ u 2009 for the U.S. market) and brokers can oﬀer no
tangible beneﬁts in exchange for high distribution fees (Bergstresser et al., 2009).
Moreover, the annuity marketplace is not as straightforward as might be imagined. Consider
the annuity rate, which is the ratio of the annual income guaranteed for life by the insurance
company to the single premium. Typically, the “headline” annuity rates quoted in the popular
press are for a single premium of $100000. An annuity rate of 5% means that the annuitant
receives $5000 per annum in exchange for the upfront payment of $100000. However, an
insurance company that oﬀers the highest headline annuity rate may not oﬀer the highest
annuity rate for other amounts of single premium. It may be a tactical decision by the insurance
company (Harrison, 2012), or due to ﬁxed costs incurred by selling each annuity contract, or
simply a reﬂection of the fact that annuity rates are not necessarily constant across same sex
individuals of the same age; a wealthy man may have a higher expected lifetime than a poor
one, resulting in a lower annuity rate for the former.
The need for a transparent annuity market is critical so that individuals can make informed
decisions on how to manage their assets. They are required to make very complex decisions
on how their retirement will be ﬁnanced. For example, they have to take account of relatively
concrete factors such as Social Security beneﬁts, housing, income from other pension plans, as
well as taking a view on unknowns like future inﬂation, life expectancy and future healthcare
costs. There are other considerations regarding the individual’s quality of life, as well as the
desire to bequeath money to others; see Smith and Keeney (2005) on making decisions about
investments in quality of life.The annuity overlay fund 5
With academic studies able to give only a broad indication if the prices of life annuities are
fair, the ability of ordinary consumers to judge their value is likely to be much lower. Many
individuals are unaware of basic economics and ﬁnance (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011) and lack
conﬁdence in their ﬁnancial literacy (Graham et al., 2009). Furthermore, the simple life annuity
is in competition for retirees’ savings with much more complicated structured products. The
latter include various ﬁnancial and insurance options and guarantees, which makes it diﬃcult to
ascertain if they oﬀer value-for-money (Carlin et al., 2013). Indeed, attempts to value some of
the mortality options in variable annuities are the subject of highly technical academic papers
(e.g. see Milevsky and Promislow 2001 and Milevsky and Posner 2001, the latter ﬁnding that
market prices for insurance risk charges are substantially above their theoretical values). If we
can make the basic life annuity contract more transparent, then perhaps we can also improve
the transparency of these more complicated products.
We present an annuity overlay fund that enables cost transparency while giving one of the
main beneﬁts of the life annuity, namely the pooling of mortality risk across a group of people.
It overcomes several disadvantages of the life annuity.
• Cost transparency. Within the proposed annuity overlay fund, costs can be charged to each
individual as they occur. As investment risk is separated from mortality risk, costs can
be attributed to each source independently. For example, administration costs, investment
management fees and sales commission can be charged separately to the consumer. If an
individual believes that the investment management fees are too high, then they can switch
to another fund manager (Blake et al. 2013, Christoﬀersen et al. 2013).
• Control over investments. With an annuity overlay fund, each individual retains absolute
control over their own investments. They can decide how much to invest and how to allocate
those investments among any asset class. They can include their house among the assets while
continuing to live there. Contrast this with a life annuity contract, in which the individual
no longer has any investments since the underlying assets are held by the insurer.
• Opt in or opt out. An individual can decide to remove the annuity overlay fund from all or
some of their assets at any time. For the administrator of the annuity overlay fund, this mayThe annuity overlay fund 6
be an incentive to keep the administrative costs low (Bharath et al., 2013). Similarly, the
participants can decide to add the overlay to more of their assets at any time. This ﬂexibility
does not occur with a life annuity contract which is usually binding until death or, at best,
an extremely costly contract to exit.
• Tangible ﬁnancial gains from pooling mortality risk. Participants in the overlay receive ﬁ-
nancial payments from the pooling of mortality risk. The payments are in addition to any
ﬁnancial gains and are always nonnegative while the participant is alive.
• Investment framing. The annuity overlay allows the sharing of mortality risk to be evaluated
in terms of yield like any other investment decision. It may be a more attractive framing of
the ﬁnancial beneﬁts to be gained from pooling mortality risk than the natural consumption
frame of the life annuity (Agnew et al. 2008 and Brown et al. 2008).
The annuity overlay fund enables mortality cross-subsidies, investment returns and costs to
be identiﬁed individually and communicated to the consumers. Furthermore, the overlay could
be managed at a very low cost: as there are no guarantees, there are no reserving requirements.
The annuity overlay fund is fundamentally diﬀerent to a life annuity: the latter transfers
mortality risk to an insurer, whereas the former pools mortality risk among the participants in
the structure. Instead, it is a means of sharing the random ﬂuctuations risk of mortality. It
does not guarantee an income until death and it does not protect against longevity risk, that
is the risk of under-estimating how long you may be expected to live. This means that the
annuity overlay fund is not an insurance product.
Even though the annuity overlay fund allows mortality risk to be separated from investment
risk, the motivation is not to enable people to trade in the ﬁnancial market themselves. Trading
by individuals in the ﬁnancial markets is fraught with problems (for example, see Barber and
Odean 2000a, Barber and Odean 2000b and Barber and Odean 2000c). Rather, the motivation
is to arrive at a transparent market in which people understand what they are paying for and
can determine if the costs charged are reasonable, a market in which consumers can more easily
compare products between sellers and buy only what they need.
The main purpose of the present paper is toThe annuity overlay fund 7
• explain the structure and operation of the annuity overlay fund,
• show that it can be optimal to join the annuity overlay fund, and
• investigate the trade-oﬀ between return and volatility, from both a theoretical and a numerical
perspective. We derive rules-of-thumb to explain the trade-oﬀ, and ﬁnd that the spread of
the age-wealth proﬁle of the participants is very important.
2 The annuity overlay fund: toy example
We begin by illustrating the annuity overlay fund with a toy example that communicates the
basic idea. Note that the toy example is unrealistic, as it assumes that no ﬁnancial return
accumulates on wealth, and it only approximates the risk-sharing mechanism of the proposed
fund; the correct, instantaneous approach is detailed in Section 3. Nevertheless, the toy example
demonstrates how the proposed fund allows people with very diﬀerent characteristics to pool
their mortality in an actuarially fair way.
In the example, participants in the annuity overlay fund agree to pool their mortality expe-
rience together for one month. Each participant has a ﬁxed initial wealth. The wealth of the
participants who die during the month is put in a notional mortality account. At the end of the
month, the money in the notional mortality account is shared among all the participants, in-
cluding those who just died during the month. The payment that each participant receives from
the notional mortality account is proportional to their individual mortality rate and wealth.
The annuity overlay fund has a distinctive feature not shared by either the pooled annuity
fundsspace which have been proposed and analyzed before in the literature (e.g., see Donnelly
et al. 2013, Piggott et al. 2005, Qiao and Sherris 2013, Richter and Weber 2011, Stamos 2008,
Valdez et al. 2006). It allows individuals to exit the fund before death, and to do so without any
ﬁnancial penalty. This is a key feature that distinguishes our pooled fund from all others. The
reason why individuals can exit the annuity overlay fund without paying a ﬁnancial penalty is
that it is actuarially-fair at every instant in time.
Actuarial fairness is critical, particularly when there is a ﬁnite number of heterogeneousThe annuity overlay fund 8
Table 1: Characteristics of Alice and Bob at the start of the month.
Name Wealth Probability of dying in the next month
Alice $1000000 0.2%
Bob $50000 0.1%
members in the group. It means that no single subgroup is subsidizing the remaining members.
For example, as shown in Donnelly (2014), the group self-annuitization scheme proposed by
Piggott et al. (2005) results in the richer members of the group subsidizing the poorer members.
Our proposed fund diﬀers in another important way from other pooled funds: in the an-
nuity overlay fund, participants have true individual investment freedom. They can decide at
any time to change their investment strategy, again without paying any ﬁnancial penalty. In
the other proposed pooled annuity funds, the participants are forced implicitly to follow the
same investment strategy as the people with whom they are pooling their mortality risk. The
investment freedom becomes apparent when we move to the instantaneous approach in Section
3.
Consider two people, Alice and Bob, with the characteristics shown in Table 1. Alice and
Bob agree to enter the annuity overlay fund for one month. There are no other participants. If
Alice dies during the month then her wealth is put in a notional mortality account. The same
rule applies to Bob if he dies. We assume throughout the paper that deaths occur independently
of each other and that there is no uncertainty about the probability of death. At the end of
the month, the money in the notional mortality account is shared among Alice and Bob in
proportion to their wealth and probability of death.
Suppose Bob is the only one to die during the month. When he dies, his wealth of $50000
is put in the notional mortality account. At the end of the month, the money in the account is
shared out as follows. Alice gets
$50000 ×
$1000000 × 0.2%
$1000000 × 0.2% + $50000 × 0.1%
= $50000 ×
40
41
= $48780.
This is Alice’s actuarial gain from participating in the fund for one month. It is based on
Alice’s expected wealth at risk due to her death over the month, relative to Bob’s expectedThe annuity overlay fund 9
wealth at risk. It is a return due to sharing mortality risk. Her wealth at the end of the month
is calculated by adding her actuarial gain to her wealth of $1000000, giving her a total wealth
of $1048780 at the end of the month.
Meanwhile, Bob gets the $1220 that is left in the notional mortality account. This can also
be determined by the allocation method:
$50000 ×
$50000 × 0.1%
$1000000 × 0.2% + $50000 × 0.1%
= $50000 ×
1
41
= $1220.
Note that to calculate Bob’s wealth at the end of the month in the same way as we did for
Alice, we determine ﬁrst his actuarial gain as
−$50000 + $1220 = −$48780.
His actuarial gain is the sum of the amount of his wealth transferred to the notional mortality
account, due to his death, and his share of the notional mortality account at the end of the
month. Thus Bob loses $48780 as a result of dying. His total wealth at the end of the month
is the sum of his actuarial gain and his wealth of $50000, giving a total wealth of $1220, as
before. As Bob is dead, the money is paid to his estate. Although the sum paid to Bob’s estate
is non-trivial in the toy example, in practice we do not expect that the annuity overlay fund
operates for only two people. It is intended to enable a large group of people to pool their
mortality risk. From the perspective of the dying members, the annuity overlay fund operates
similarly to certain other pooled annuity funds and ﬁxed-payout life annuities. The sum paid
to Bob’s estate can be thought of as a balancing item to make the annuity overlay fund work
for any group of heterogenous participants.
Notice that Alice’s actuarial gain of $48780 exactly cancels with Bob’s actuarial gain of
−$48780. This is due to the fact that no money is created by pooling mortality risk; the wealth
of the dead is simply re-distributed among all the participants.
Repeating the above calculations across all possible scenarios, we obtain Table 2 (the amount
of money in the notional mortality account at the end of the month), Table 3 (the actuarialThe annuity overlay fund 10
Table 2: Notional mortality account at the end of month, which depends on who dies during the month.
Bob
alive dead
Alice
alive $0 $50000
dead $1000000 $1050000
Table 3: Alice’s and Bob’s actuarial gains at the end of month, which depend on who dies during the
month. Alice’s actuarial gains are in normal text and Bob’s actuarial gains are in italics.
Bob
alive dead
Alice
alive
$0 + $48780
$0 −$48 780
dead
−$24390 + $24390
+$24 390 −$24 390
gains of Alice and Bob) and Table 4 (the wealth of Alice and Bob at the end of the month).
We see from Table 3 that, as long as Alice survives to the end of the month, her actuarial
gains are positive. The same observation holds for Bob and, indeed, holds more generally for
any group. It is an important feature of the fund since it is an incentive to join the fund.
At the end of the month, the surviving participants choose whether or not to pool their
mortality for another month, and how much wealth they want to pool. This is a highly attractive
feature of our fund. It means that individuals can withdraw money according to their needs.
For example, they may have long-term care or large medical bills to pay. In comparison,
conventional annuities and other pooled annuity funds either do not permit exits for reasons
other than death, or they apply a severe ﬁnancial penalty to any withdrawn funds.
Allowing the participants to leave the fund without ﬁnancial penalty is a consequence of the
expected actuarial gains of Alice over all scenarios being zero, and similarly for Bob. In other
Table 4: Alice’s and Bob’s wealth at the end of month, which depend on who dies during the month.
Alice’s wealth is in normal text and Bob’s wealth is in italics.
Bob
alive dead
Alice
alive
$1000000 $1048780
$50 000 $1 220
dead
$975610 $1024390
$74 390 $25 610The annuity overlay fund 11
words, there is a zero expected gain from pooling mortality over the month. Thus, at the end of
the month, neither Alice nor Bob have any further actuarial obligation to each other and thus
can take their money and go their separate ways.
The same approach can be used to pool mortality risk among a large group of people.
Indeed, we can think of Alice as a proxy for an aggregate group of individuals. For example,
she could represent a group of 100 individuals each with wealth $10000.
The toy example made the unrealistic assumption that the return on wealth is zero. We
show in the sequel that the fund can be made actuarially fair at all instants in time, and not
just on a monthly basis, while allowing for investment returns.
3 Theoretical operation of the fund
Here we show how the annuity overlay fund operates theoretically, which is on an instantaneous
basis. We prove that the fund is actuarially fair, in the sense that the expected instantaneous
actuarial gains of each participant is zero at all times. Consumption is ignored because it does
not aﬀect the results.
3.1 Setup
Suppose that there are M ∈ N groups of individuals who participate in the annuity overlay
fund. We call the collection of M groups the portfolio. Within the mth group there are Lm
0 ≥ 1
individuals age xm alive at time 0 (for example, we could have only one individual in each group
so that Lm
0 = 1 for each m). Individuals within a group are homogeneous in the sense that they
have the same mortality characteristics, risk preferences and initial wealth.
We model the survival of the ith individual in group m by the Poisson process Nm,i :=
{N
m,i
t ,t ≥ 0}. We assume N
m,i
0 = 0 for all m and i. If the ith individual in group m is
alive at time t, then N
m,i
t = 0, and otherwise N
m,i
t = 1. The rate parameter, called the force
of mortality or instantaneous rate of mortality, of the Poisson process Nm,i is λm
t at time t.
Deaths are assumed to occur independently of each other, so that the Poisson processes are
independent processes.The annuity overlay fund 12
Denoting by Nm
t the number of deaths which have occurred up to and including at time t
in the mth group, we have the relationship
Nm
t :=
Lm
0  
i=1
N
m,i
t . (1)
Deﬁne the number of people alive at time t in the mth group as Lm
t = Lm
0 −Nm
t . Then Nm :=
{Nm
t ,t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with rate λm
t Lm
t− at time t. As deaths occur independently,
the processes N1,...,NM are independent.
The ﬁnancial market consists of two traded assets: a risky asset and a risk-free asset. The
risk-free asset has price Bt at time t with dynamics
dBt = rBtdt, (2)
with constant risk-free rate of return r > 0. The price process S of the risky asset is driven by
a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion Z, so that at time t it has dynamics
dSt = St (µdt + σdZt), S0 > 0 constant, (3)
with µ > r constant and σ > 0 constant.
The Brownian motion and Poisson processes are deﬁned on the same complete probability
space (Ω,F,P) and are independent processes. With N(P) denoting the P-null sets in the
probability space, the information at time t ≥ 0 is represented by the ﬁltration
Ft = σ{(N1,1
s ,...,N
1,L1
0
s ,...,NM,1
s ,...,N
M,LM
0
s ,Zs),s ∈ [0,t]} ∨ N(P). (4)
In other words, at each time t, it is known which individuals have died in each group and the
price of the risky asset at all times up to and including at time t.
We assume that individuals have provided for any desired bequests in advance of commit-
ting any assets to the annuity overlay fund, for example by buying a life insurance policy or
committing less than 100% of their assets to the fund.The annuity overlay fund 13
3.2 Theoretical operation on an instantaneous basis
The pool of M groups of individuals participate in the annuity overlay fund. In addition to
joining the fund, participants invest in the ﬁnancial market. For simplicity, we assume here
that participants only exit the fund due to their own death, although this assumption can be
relaxed without changing the results.
Denote the wealth at time t of each participant in the mth group who is alive at time t by
Wm
t , for any t ≥ 0 and for each m = 1,...,M. If an individual in the mth group dies during
the short time interval (t−,t) then her wealth Wm
t− is put in the notional mortality account.
Let Ut represent the amount of money which has passed through the notional mortality
account up to time t. The amount of money which is put in the notional mortality account
during the short time interval (t−,t) is written mathematically as
dUt =
M  
m=1
Wm
t−dNm
t . (5)
The amount dUt is then shared out at time t among all the participants who were alive at
time t−. The amount allocated to each participant is proportional to their individual wealth
and force of mortality. Thus each participant in the kth group who was alive at time t− receives
a payment at time t of amount
λk
tWk
t−  M
m=1 Wm
t−λm
t Lm
t−
dUt (6)
from the notional mortality account. The payment, which we call a mortality credit is made
irrespective of whether or not the participant is alive at time t.
Formally we calculate the actuarial gains of each individual due to their participation in the
fund over the time interval (t−,t). This allows us to separate the gains due to investment in
the ﬁnancial market from the actuarial gains due to sharing mortality risk. We denote by G
k,i
t
the total actuarial gains up to time t of a ﬁxed individual i in the kth group. Allowing for the
wealth of those dying being transferred into the notional mortality account, the change in theThe annuity overlay fund 14
actuarial gains at time t of individual i in the kth group is given as
dG
k,i
t =

    
    
λk
t Wk
t− PM
m=1 Wm
t−λm
t Lm
t−
dUt − Wk
t−, if individual i dies during (t−,t),
λk
t Wk
t− PM
m=1 Wm
t−λm
t Lm
t−
dUt, if individual i is alive at time t,
0, if individual i is dead at time t−.
(7)
As the change in the actuarial gains dG
k,i
t is due to participation in the fund over the short
time interval (t−,t), we refer to the gains as the instantaneous actuarial gains. Since individuals
must be alive at time t− in order to participate in the fund over the time interval (t−,t), they
can not have any actuarial gain at time t if they are dead at time t−.
At time t, any individual who is still alive can continue to participate in the fund for another
instant in time, if they choose to do so.
Proposition 3.1. The expected instantaneous actuarial gains for a participant in the annuity
overlay fund are zero at all times, i.e. for individual i in the kth group,
E
 
dG
k,i
t
 
     Ft−
 
= 0,
for all t ≥ 0 and for each i = 1,...,Lk
0 and k = 1,...,M.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 is a consequence of participants pooling their mortality risk only instan-
taneously. This stands in contrast to products like life annuities for which annuitants pool
their mortality risk over their lifetime, and thus cannot exit either before death or without
being charged an onerous ﬁnancial penalty. In the annuity overlay fund, a participant can exit
without ﬁnancial penalty, leaving with the full value of their wealth.
However, even though the expected actuarial gains are zero, the incentive to join the annuity
overlay fund is that the actuarial gains for a participant who survives are always nonnegative.
Proposition 3.2. Conditional upon survival, the expected instantaneous actuarial gains forThe annuity overlay fund 15
individual i in the kth group are
E
 
dG
k,i
t
   
   Ft−, N
k,i
t = 0
 
= λk
tWk
t−
 
1 −
λk
tWk
t−  M
m=1 Wm
t−λm
t Lm
t−
 
dt, (8)
for all t ≥ 0 and for each k = 1,...,M.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 3.3. Conditional upon survival, the expected instantaneous actuarial gains for a
participant in the annuity overlay fund are nonnegative at all times.
Corollary 3.3 shows that, as long as a participant survives, they do not lose ﬁnancially from
participating in the fund. This is an important point and it is a key diﬀerence between the
annuity overlay fund and a life annuity. It means that the natural frame for the annuity overlay
fund is an investment frame, which considers its risk and return features.
In contrast, the natural frame for evaluating the life annuity is a consumption frame, which
focuses on what can be consumed over time. However, many individuals may prefer to evaluate
the life annuity in an investment frame (Brown et al., 2008). Having paid a known single
premium at the start of the contract, the individual may ask if they can live long enough to
make back their original “investment” (Hu and Scott, 2007).
For example, consider an individual who pays a single premium of $100000 to buy a life
annuity income of $5000 per annum, paid at the end of each year until the individual dies.
If the individual dies in the sixth year after purchase, then they have received 5 payments of
$5000. From the individual’s perspective, the annuity’s “internal rate of return” is -33.5% per
annum3. The individual has to live at least 20 years in order for the annuity to break even, and
live more than 26 years to have a return of 2% per annum or higher.
If living long enough to beneﬁt ﬁnancially is a criterion for buying an annuity, then it may
not look like an attractive investment to people who under-estimate their future lifetime. That
may be true for a large number of people. For example, in a survey of people age 45 years
3Of course, a guarantee can be purchased in conjunction with the life annuity so that the annuity income is
guaranteed for, say, 10 years. However, as a guarantee can also be purchased in conjunction with the annuity
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to 80 years, Greenwald and EBRI (2012, Figure 15) report that 41% of the surveyed group
guessed a personal future life expectancy that was 5 years or more below their expected future
life expectancy, based on a population mortality table suitable for their age and sex.
This issue does not occur with the annuity overlay fund. Its structure means that the
individual gains an explicit ﬁnancial payment while alive due to the pooling of mortality. They
do not lose any of their money from pooling mortality risk until they die, unlike in the life
annuity where the “loss” occurs at the start of the contract. The annuity overlay fund may be
more attractive to individuals simply because of the investment framing of the mortality gains.
Additionally, observe that the annuity overlay fund is closer in spirit to the actuarial notes4
introduced and analyzed in Yaari (1965), than the life annuity. Although a group of people
beneﬁt from mortality gains in a life annuity contract, the gains to each individual can only be
appreciated by using a lifetime approach, which involves assigning probabilities to each future
possible lifetime. It requires a sophisticated and abstract calculation. With the annuity overlay
fund, surviving individuals have an annual return that is at least as big as the return from
investment in the ﬁnancial market. They are not required to use a lifetime probability model
to appreciate the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of pooling mortality5.
3.3 Practical considerations
We have presented the annuity overlay fund in its most general form, allowing people to leave
whenever they choose. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the fund could realistically be operated
without some restrictions. However, the main point is that, as the proposed fund is actuarially
fair at every instant in time, it is very ﬂexible and can be adapted to any required restrictions.
For example, if the fund has a particular purpose, such as to pool mortality risk from any cause
of death, then allowing individuals to exit at any time, or without paying a ﬁnancial penalty,
would not be advisable; individuals have more information on their own health than the other
participants in the fund.
These points aside, one may wonder how to implement the mortality risk-sharing mechanism
4An actuarial note pays out at a ﬁxed time upon survival to that time. A similar contract is the Arrow annuity
deﬁned in Davidoﬀ et al. (2005).
5However, to switch to a consumption frame they do need such a model.The annuity overlay fund 17
in practice. For example, we might know someone’s date of death but not their exact time of
death. This would imply that the distribution of money from the notional mortality account
should be done at most daily. We can imagine that broadly the implementation steps could be:
• An age- and time-dependent force of mortality function is assigned to each participant
upon joining the annuity overlay fund. This may incur an initial charge to each participant.
• The wealth of participants at the start of each day is recorded.
• Upon the notiﬁcation of a death among the participants,
– the wealth of the dead participant is liquidated and distributed among the partici-
pants, using a discretized version of equation (6). The calculation is done as at the
date of death, using the wealth and the force of mortality appropriate to each partic-
ipant at start of the date of death. However, the amount of money to be distributed
from the notional mortality account must clearly be the current (liquidated) wealth
of the dead participant.
– The mortality credits are paid to the surviving participants, either as cash or invested
in line with a participant’s chosen investment strategy.
– The mortality credit due to the dead participant is paid to their estate.
• Each year, participants receive an investment statement detailing their current individual
wealth, how much they gained from their investments over the year, the amount of any
mortality credit paid to them, and costs such as investment management fees, adminis-
tration costs, and so on.
• Additionally, each participant could receive annual information on how much mortality
credit they can reasonably anticipate from the annuity overlay fund over the next year,
based on the composition of the annuity overlay fund and the participant’s wealth and
investment strategy to date. Thus we do not suggest that participants are supplied with
details of each other’s wealth and force of mortality, but that they are given an indication
of the future mortality credit that they may receive from the annuity overlay fund.The annuity overlay fund 18
• The mortality functions are updated periodically to allow for unanticipated changes in
mortality.
We have shown actuarial fairness holds instantaneously in a theoretical model. In practice,
performing the calculations daily, as suggested above, should give a reasonable approximation
to continuous time and hence actuarial fairness. A critical question is when could actuarial
fairness break down in a non-trivial way in the real world. Potential pitfalls include:
• Incorrect choice of mortality model for the participants, for reasons that may be due to
moral hazard, adverse selection or incorrect assessment by the fund administrators.
• Large changes in the wealth of the participants over the course of a day. This could be
allowed for by a suitable adjustment to the calculation of the mortality credits, such as
using average wealth value of the participants over the day, if the data is available, or by
having a fund in which all participants have the same investment strategy.
In general the choice of the forces of mortality will depend on the conditions placed on
entering and exiting the fund. We do not consider in this paper what restrictions should be
placed on a fund to meet a particular purpose. Neither do we explore the additional issue of
adverse selection, which is a problem also faced by annuity providers. However, observe equation
(6), which shows the share of the notional mortality account paid to each participant in the
kth group. We see that the relative values of the forces of mortality are more important than
the absolute values. Thus we need a mortality model which accurately captures the relative
diﬀerences in mortality among participants, rather than their absolute diﬀerences, so that the
notional mortality account is shared out equitably.
Furthermore the mortality model can be updated frequently to reﬂect current mortality,
since the money in the notional mortality account is shared out immediately. Thus we can
allow for longevity improvements and other variations in mortality through time, something
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4 The inﬁnite annuity overlay fund and its wider connections
We have already observed that, compared to investment in the ﬁnancial market alone, it is
rational for an investor with no bequest motive and who prefers more money to less, to join
the annuity overlay fund; this is the practical implication of Corollary 3.3. Here we describe
an idealized version of the annuity overlay fund, called the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund, in
which there are inﬁnitely-many participants in each group. The inﬁnite annuity overlay fund
is strongly connected to both the classical life annuity contract and a particular type of pooled
annuity fund, as we show in Section 4.2.
Whether the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund can be used as a satisfactory approximation to
a speciﬁc ﬁnite annuity overlay fund depends on the number of participants and their wealth-
mortality proﬁle. Our results in the sequel suggest that, for a suitably diversiﬁed fund, the
numbers of participants may be in the hundreds rather than the thousands for this approx-
imation to be reasonable. However, we emphasize that actuarial fairness continues to hold
in the annuity overlay fund regardless of the number of participants and the heterogeneity of
the group. This is a very important point which should not be disregarded as mere actuarial
nitpicking, particularly for the relevance of the proposed fund to a real-world application.
4.1 Description of the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund
Here we determine the actuarial gains in the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund. Consider an indi-
vidual who has no bequest motive. Suppose the individual i joins the annuity overlay fund and
is assigned to the kth group.
Proposition 4.1. Conditional upon survival, the variance of the instantaneous actuarial gains
for individual i in the kth group is
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for all t ≥ 0 and for each k = 1,...,M.The annuity overlay fund 20
Proof. See Appendix A.
Further assume that at time t > 0, each group in the annuity overlay fund has exactly the
same number of members, so that Lt− := L1
t− = L2
t− = ··· = LM
t− > 0. In that case, the
instantaneous actuarial gains of the chosen individual, assuming they are alive at time t, are
from (7),
dG
k,i
t =
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m=1 Wm
t−λm
t
dUt. (10)
Now let the number of members in each group tend to inﬁnity. From Proposition 3.2 we get
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From Proposition 4.1,
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Thus there is no volatility in the instantaneous actuarial gains as the number of participants
in each group tends to inﬁnity. In an inﬁnite annuity overlay fund, deaths occur continuously,
which releases a continuous ﬂow of money into the notational mortality account. As this is
shared among inﬁnitely-many participants, their individual wealth increases at a continuous
rate equal to their own force of mortality, with zero volatility. In this perfect pool, the volatility
of return on wealth arises solely from investment in the ﬁnancial market.
To see how the actuarial gains in the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund aﬀect the wealth dynamics
of the participants, assume the ﬁnancial market detailed in Section 3.1. Consider an individual
i who is a member of the kth group in the annuity overlay fund. Denote by πt the amount of
the individual i’s wealth invested in the risky stock at time t. Then ignoring consumption, the
dynamics of their wealth process are
dWk
t =
 
rWk
t + (µ − r)πt + λk
tWk
t
 
dt + σπtdZt. (13)
The beneﬁt of joining the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund is seen in the additional term λk
tWk
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an increase in the wealth due to the pooling of mortality risk with inﬁnitely-many other people.
4.2 Connection of the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund to other annuities
The actuarial gains in the (heterogeneous) inﬁnite annuity overlay fund are identical to those in
the (homogeneous) inﬁnite pooled annuity fund, analyzed by Stamos (2008). This can be seen
by comparing equation (13) with Stamos (2008, equation (17))6. In the latter fund, there are
an inﬁnite number of participants who are independent and identical copies of each other. The
wealth of the deceased are shared equally among all the survivors. Both Donnelly et al. (2013)
and Stamos (2008) analyze this type of pooled annuity fund.
Consequently, the welfare analysis of Stamos (2008) can be applied directly to the inﬁnite
annuity overlay fund. His analysis shows signiﬁcant utility gains for individuals participating
in an inﬁnite annuity overlay fund compared to a pure withdrawal plan. The welfare gains
of the annuity overlay fund compared to a ﬁxed-payout annuity depend on the individual’s
level of risk aversion: an individual with low to moderate levels of risk aversion would derive
greater utility from joining the annuity overlay fund compared to buying a ﬁxed-payout annuity,
whereas the situation is the reverse for an individuals with a high level of risk aversion. We
refer the interested reader to Stamos (2008) for the precise details.
We can also connect the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund with a life annuity. Suppose that at
time 0, the individual i invests her wealth of $w entirely in the risk-free asset and joins the
kth group of the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund. She consumes her wealth continuously at the
constant rate $C per annum. Then the dynamics of her wealth process Wt as long as she is
alive, are
dWk
t =
 
rWk
t + λk
tWk
t − C
 
dt, (14)
subject to Wk
0 = w. Those familiar with life insurance reserving may recognize (14) as the
dynamics of the reserve held by the insurance company for a single life annuity with annual
payment $C paid continuously, when mortality risk is fully diversiﬁed. It is a version of the
celebrated Thiele’s diﬀerential equation (Dickson et al., 2009, Section 7.5.1). Thus equation (14)
6Note that Stamos (2008) uses π to denote the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset, whereas we
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tells us that the wealth of a surviving participant in the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund matches
the reserve held by an insurance company against each of its annuity policies, when they both
use the same assumptions and the annuity income paid by the insurance company matches the
participant’s consumption rate C.
5 Analysis of the ﬁnite annuity overlay fund
Here we consider an annuity overlay fund in which there are only a ﬁnite number of members
in each group. It is important to consider how the heterogeneity among the participants can
aﬀect their actuarial gains.
For a member of the annuity overlay fund there are two sources of wealth volatility: the
investment market and the membership of the fund. We assume that a member is indiﬀerent to
the source of volatility. For example, they do not care whether their wealth has increased due
to a share dividend payment or due to another member dying. We want to analyze the impact
of a heterogeneous fund (in terms of the mortality-wealth proﬁle of the fund) on the wealth
volatility of a participant in the fund, while allowing for the participants to invest their wealth
in a ﬁnancial market. It may be that the volatility due to deaths occurring in the fund is not
signiﬁcant compared to volatility from the ﬁnancial market.
We assume that members’ mortality distribution is known. While the expected return
on wealth due to sharing mortality risk in the annuity overlay fund is consistent with the
distribution, the actual return may diﬀer due to volatility in the deaths in the fund.
We compare participation in the annuity overlay fund to membership of a benchmark fund
called the mortality–linked fund (a more extensive discussion of the mortality–linked fund is
provided by Donnelly et al. 2013). In the mortality–linked fund, wealth volatility arises from
the investment market only. The random mortality credit of the annuity overlay fund is replaced
by a deterministic mortality-linked interest rate paid by an insurer. In this context, the insurer
is analogous to an annuity provider: they are indirectly pooling the mortality of the members
of the mortality–linked fund.
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is equal to the member’s force of mortality but with a reduction to allow for costs. Note that, in
this section, we use the word costs in a diﬀerent sense to earlier. The costs are what the insurer
of the mortality–linked fund charges to the individual to remove the latter’s mortality risk. We
emphasize that the mortality-linked interest rate is a deterministic interest rate. Exactly as in
the annuity overlay fund, members of the mortality–linked fund are free to invest their wealth in
the ﬁnancial market as they choose. The costs are the tool that we use to analyze the diﬀerences
between the annuity overlay fund and the mortality–linked fund.
Deﬁnition 5.1. The instantaneous breakeven costs applying at time t are the costs such that,
for equal instantaneous volatilities of return on the wealth, a surviving individual has the same
instantaneous expected return on wealth from the annuity overlay fund as from the mortality–
linked fund at time t.
The idea is that we calculate ﬁrst the volatility of return on wealth for a participant in the
annuity overlay fund, given that some proportion of their wealth is invested in a risky ﬁnancial
asset. Next we calculate the proportion of wealth that an identical member of the mortality–
linked fund would have to invest in the risky asset in order to have the same volatility of return
on wealth. The proportion should be higher for the member of the mortality–linked fund since
they have volatility from the ﬁnancial market only.
Finally, we calculate the costs such that the expected return for the two individuals is the
same, allowing for the diﬀerent proportions of wealth invested in the risky asset. These are
the instantaneous breakeven costs. If the actual costs charged by the mortality–linked fund are
higher than the instantaneous breakeven costs, then an individual can obtain a higher expected
return from the annuity overlay fund for the same amount of volatility of return on wealth.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we write down the expected returns and volatility of a chosen
individual in the annuity overlay fund and mortality–linked fund. This allows us to write down
a mathematical expression for the instantaneous breakeven costs in Section 5.3.The annuity overlay fund 24
5.1 Finite annuity overlay fund
As before, we assume that there are M ∈ N groups of individuals in the annuity overlay fund.
Each surviving participant in the kth group has wealth Wk
t , force of mortality λk
t and invests a
proportion pk
t of their wealth in the risky asset at time t. The remaining proportion of wealth
1−pk
t is invested in the risk-free asset. Thus the wealth Wk
t of an individual i in the kth group
in the ﬁnite annuity overlay fund has the dynamics
dWk
t =
 
r + pk
t(µ − r)
 
Wk
t−dt + σpk
tWk
t−dZt + dG
k,i
t , (15)
subject to Wk
0 = wk
0 > 0. The ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side are due to the investment
in the ﬁnancial market. The third term, dG
k,i
t , represents the instantaneous actuarial gains
from participation in the fund.
Conditional on individual i surviving to time t, her instantaneous expected return on wealth
is calculated from the dynamics given by equation (15) and Proposition 3.2 to be
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in which we recall that Lm
t− represents the number of individuals in the mth group who are alive
at time t−.
Similarly, the instantaneous variance of the return on wealth conditional on individual i
surviving to time t is
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The same decomposition is seen for the instantaneous expected return on wealth and the
instantaneous variance of return on wealth: there is a component due to individual i’s investment
in the ﬁnancial market, and a component from her actuarial gains.The annuity overlay fund 25
5.2 Mortality–linked fund with costs
Suppose instead that the individual i decides to join the mortality–linked fund, which is operated
by an insurer. As long as she survives, a mortality-linked interest rate is paid by the insurer on
her wealth, less the costs which are speciﬁed below.
In the mortality–linked fund, let ˜ pk
t be the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset
at time t by individual i. The remaining proportion of wealth 1− ˜ pk
t is invested in the risk-free
asset. The costs that the insurer charges to individual i are represented by ak
t. As long as
individual i survives, her wealth ˜ Wk
t has the dynamics
d ˜ Wk
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r + ˜ pk
t(µ − r)
 
˜ Wk
t−dt + σ˜ pk
t ˜ Wk
t−dZt + (1 − ak
t)λk
t ˜ Wk
t−dt,
subject to ˜ Wk
0 = wk
0 > 0. The term (1−ak
t)λk
t ˜ Wk
t−dt represents the amount of mortality credit
paid by the insurer to individual i at time t. Note that for ak
t = 0, the wealth dynamics for
the surviving members of the mortality–linked fund match those of an inﬁnite annuity overlay
fund, in which there are an inﬁnite number of members in each group of the annuity overlay
fund7.
The instantaneous expected return on wealth conditional on individual i being alive at time
t is
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The instantaneous variance of the return of the wealth, conditional on individual i being
alive at time t, is
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Unlike in the annuity overlay fund, there is no uncertainty about the mortality credit for
the participant8; the insurer pays it to individual i as long as individual i is alive. The only
source of volatility for a survivor in the mortality–linked fund is the ﬁnancial market; compare
7It can be shown that the inﬁnite annuity overlay fund coincides with the pooled annuity fund analyzed in
Donnelly et al. 2013 and Stamos 2008.
8Instead, it is borne by the insurer. Additionally, the insurer is exposed to model risk if the mortality index
is not representative of the participant’s actual mortality.The annuity overlay fund 26
(17) and (19).
5.3 Instantaneous breakeven costs
Here we calculate the instantaneous breakeven costs. For ease of notation, we use bold notation
to denote a vector of length M. For example, pt = (p1
t,...,pM
t )⊤, Wt− = (W1
t−,...,WM
t−)⊤
and so on, where we use to denote X⊤ the transpose of the vector X. We also deﬁne the useful
short-hand notation
Sk(w,ℓ ℓ ℓ,λ λ λ) :=
 M
m=1 (wm)
2 λmℓm −
 
wk 2 λk
  M
m=1 wmλmℓm
 2 , (20)
for all (w,λ λ λ,ℓ ℓ ℓ) ∈ RM
+ × RM
+ × NM and for each k = 1,...,M.
Lemma 5.2 (Instantaneous breakeven costs). Suppose an individual i, who is in the kth group
of the annuity overlay fund, invests the proportion pk
t of her wealth in the risky asset. To have
the same instantaneous volatility of wealth in the mortality–linked fund, she must invest the
proportion ˜ pk(pt,Wt−,λ λ λt,Lt−) of her wealth in the risky asset, with
˜ pk(p,w,λ λ λ,ℓ ℓ ℓ) :=
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for all (p,w,λ λ λ,ℓ ℓ ℓ) ∈ RM
+ × RM
+ × RM
+ × NM. Then the instantaneous breakeven costs are ak⋆
t =
ak⋆(pt,Wt−,λ λ λt,Lt−), with
ak⋆(p,w,λ λ λ,ℓ ℓ ℓ) :=
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m=1 wmλmℓm, (22)
for all (p,w,λ λ λ,ℓ ℓ ℓ) ∈ RM
+ × RM
+ × RM
+ × NM.
Proof. To show (21), equate the instantaneous volatilities, given by equations (17) and (19),
and rearrange. To show (22), equate the instantaneous expected returns, given by equation
(16) and equation (18), and rearrange to ﬁnd ak⋆
t .
Thus the breakeven costs at which the expected returns from the funds are equal decomposesThe annuity overlay fund 27
into two components, one due to the ﬁnancial market and the other due to the pooling of
mortality. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (22) represents the extra expected
return from higher investment in the risky asset in the mortality–linked fund. The second is
the fraction of the money in the notional mortality account received by the participant at time
t.
However, it is diﬃcult to understand from equation (22) the main factors aﬀecting the
breakeven costs since the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset in the mortality–linked
fund also depends on the wealth-mortality proﬁle of the annuity overlay fund. To understand
these, we apply a Taylor series expansion to (22) to get the ﬁrst-order approximation to the
breakeven costs:
ak⋆(pt,Wt−,λ λ λt,Lt−) ≈
µ − r
2σ2
λk
t
pk
t
Sk(Wt−,λ λ λt,Lt−) +
Wk
t−λk
t  M
m=1 Wm
t−λm
t Lm
t−
. (23)
The ﬁrst-order approximation suggests that the spread of the wealth weighted by the ex-
pected number of deaths in each group, as approximated by Sk(Wt−,λ λ λt,Lt−), is a critical factor
in the determination of the breakeven costs. The reason is that a high value of Sk(Wt−,λ λ λt,Lt−)
indicates a higher volatility in the amount and timing of money that is credited to the notional
mortality account. We explore the impact of heterogeneity in the numerical illustrations next.
5.4 Numerical illustrations
We explore the impact of heterogeneity in the annuity overlay fund by comparing it with the
mortality–linked fund (the benchmark fund), for three diﬀerent heterogeneous portfolios. As
the analysis is done over an instant in time, we do not need to consider consumption. The
results suggest that
(a) there only has to be a few hundred participants in the portfolio for the breakeven costs
to be very low, allowing for moderate heterogeneity among the participants, but
(b) severe heterogeneity in the portfolio may invalidate the above conclusion. Therefore,
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The low breakeven costs are very interesting. They suggest that a group of a few hundred
individuals, who are willing to accept volatility in the return on wealth from deaths, can obtain
a higher expected return from forming an annuity overlay fund together than from the mortality–
linked fund, for the same volatility of return on wealth.
5.4.1 Description of the portfolios and calculations
The three portfolios that we study are detailed in Table 5. The intention is that they reﬂect,
in a simple way, the wealth that we might expect individuals to have at certain ages. Each
portfolio consists of a ﬁxed number of groups, with the members of each group k having the
same age xk, force of mortality λk and wealth wk. There is the same number of members L in
each group.
The “Old Spenders” portfolio is formed by people over 60 years. These people have been
spending the money that they accumulated over their working life, and so the older people
in this portfolio have less money than the younger people in the same portfolio. The “Young
Spenders” portfolio is formed by participants aged less than 60 years. These people are saving
for their retirement, and in this portfolio, the older people have more money than the younger
people in the same portfolio. Finally, we combine these two portfolios into the “Combined
Portfolio”.
For the numerical calculation of the breakeven costs for a representative group member in
each portfolio, we assume the ﬁnancial market parameters µ = 0.06, σ = 0.18 and r = 0.02
for the market behaviour. For simplicity, all participants in the annuity overlay fund invest the
proportion p =
(µ−r)
5σ2 ≈ 25% of their wealth in the risky asset. The force of mortality of each
member of group k is λk = 1
be(xk−m)/b, with m = 86.85 and b = 9.98.9
Using the above values in addition to the age and wealth values in Table 5, we calculate
the breakeven costs ak⋆ for a representative member of each group k by substituting the values
into equation (22). This is done for each of the portfolios in turn assuming that there is only
one member in each group, i.e. L = 1 (which corresponds to having 30 members in the “Old
9The parameter m is the modal age at death and b is the dispersion coeﬃcient. The mortality law, which is
a standard Gompertz law, was ﬁtted by Stamos (2008) to US female population mortality data.The annuity overlay fund 29
Table 5: Description of the portfolios. The number of members L in each group is varied in the numer-
ical simulations.
Portfolio: Old Spenders Young Spenders Combined Portfolio
Number of groups
30 30 60
in the portfolio
Number of members
L L L
within a group
Total number of
30L 30L 60L
members in portfolio
Characteristics of the
groups in the portfolio,
expressed as (group
number k, age xk of
members in group,
wealth w
k of each
member in the group)
(1, 60 years, $30) (1, 30 years, $1) (1, 30 years, $1)
(2, 61 years, $29) (2, 31 years, $2) (2, 31 years, $2)
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . (29, 58 years, $29)
. . .
. . . (30, 59 years, $30)
. . .
. . . (31, 60 years, $30)
. . .
. . . (32, 61 years, $29)
. . .
. . .
. . .
(29, 88 years, $2) (29, 58 years, $29) (59, 88 years, $2)
(30, 89 years, $1) (30, 59 years, $30) (60, 89 years, $1)
Spenders” portfolio, 30 members in the “Young Spenders” portfolio and 60 members in the
“Combined Portfolio” portfolio). We repeat the calculations assuming that there is L = 5
people in each group within a portfolio, then again assuming a group size of L = 10 and ﬁnally
we assume a group size of L = 100.
Figure 1 shows the results of the calculations. In it, the breakeven costs are expressed as a
monetary rate per unit of wealth, namely 1−e−λkak⋆
. Note that, to further ease interpretation,
we plot the costs for a group against the age of the members in that group, rather than using
the group number.
5.4.2 Discussion of the numerical results
The ﬁrst observation is that all the results show an approximately inverse relationship to the
total number of participants, regardless of whether we are considering the Old Spenders, the
Young Spenders or the Combined Portfolio.
The second, more interesting, observation is that the breakeven costs are low across all
portfolios, even when the total number of participants is small. From Figure 1(a), for the Old
Spenders with groups of size L = 10 (meaning the total number of participants is 300) theThe annuity overlay fund 30
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Figure 1: Monetary cost of breakeven costs 1 − e−λ
ka
k⋆
.
breakeven costs are less than 0.5% per annum of wealth across all groups. This means that if
the costs in the mortality–linked fund equate to more than 0.5% per annum of wealth, then the
members of this particular Old Spenders portfolio can obtain a higher expected return on wealthThe annuity overlay fund 31
from participating in the annuity overlay fund than in the mortality–linked fund, for the same
volatility of return on wealth. For example, if the costs in the mortality–linked fund were 1%
per annum of wealth and assuming individuals are indiﬀerent to the sources of volatility, then
the 300 participants obtain a higher expected return on wealth from forming an Old Spenders
portfolio together, rather than joining the mortality–linked fund.
For the Young Spenders, the breakeven costs are much lower. From Figure 1(b) for groups
of size L = 10, so that the total number of participants is 300, they are less than 0.05% per
annum of the members’ wealth. The low breakeven costs in the Young Spenders are a reﬂection
of the low mortality rate of the participants, who are less than 60 years old, meaning that deaths
occur rarely.
In the Combined Portfolio, the breakeven costs are also low when the total number of
participants is 300. As there are 60 groups in the Combined Portfolio, 300 total participants
corresponds to groups of size L = 5. From Figure 1(c), we see that the monetary cost of the
breakeven costs are less than 0.75% per annum of wealth across all groups in the portfolio.
Thus, even though the three portfolios have diﬀerent wealth-mortality proﬁles, for a ﬁxed
total number of participants the monetary cost of the breakeven costs is low. A mortality–linked
fund has to charge less than 0.75% per annum of wealth in order to be attractive to the three
considered portfolios of 300 participants. These would be very low costs indeed for the insurer
of the mortality–linked fund to charge for removing the volatility caused by deaths, when we
consider their additional costs for writing such business: the need for reserves, reinsurance,
hedging costs, regulatory costs and proﬁt.
However, while in absolute terms the breakeven costs are low, heterogeneity in the wealth-
mortality proﬁle of each portfolio certainly does have an impact. We observe that there are
quite large relative diﬀerences in the breakeven costs between the three portfolios. For example,
consider an individual who is age over 60 years old. The monetary cost rate for the individual
calculated assuming a Combined Portfolio with 300 total participants (corresponding to groups
of size L = 5 in the Combined Portfolio) is approximately 2 times higher than that calculated
assuming the Old Spenders with 300 total participants (corresponding to groups of size L = 10
in the Old Spenders); compare Figure 1(c) for L = 5 with Figure 1(a) for L = 10.The annuity overlay fund 32
The relative diﬀerences between the breakeven costs calculated for the Young Spenders and
the Combined Portfolio are even more extreme. Consider an individual who is age less than 60
years old. The monetary cost rate for the individual calculated assuming a Combined Portfolio
with 300 total participants (corresponding to groups of size L = 5 in the Combined Portfolio) is
approximately 7 times lower than that calculated assuming the Young Spenders with 300 total
participants (corresponding to groups of size L = 10 in the Young Spenders); compare Figure
1(c) for L = 5 with Figure 1(b) for L = 10.
Thus the relative attractiveness of the annuity overlay fund to the mortality–linked fund,
as measured by the breakeven costs, depends on the heterogeneity of the portfolio that the
individual can join. One way to measure the heterogeneity is by the statistic
 M
k=1
 
wk 2 λkL
  M
k=1 wkλkL
 2, (24)
which should be a rough approximation to the function Sk deﬁned by (20). It is a measure
of how “spread out” is the wealth-mortality proﬁle of the portfolio. Moreover, the ﬁrst-order
approximation to the breakeven costs given by (23) suggests that as Sk increases, and hence
as the above statistic increases, the breakeven costs increase. For L = 10, the above statistic
is 0.132 for the Old Spenders and, for L = 5, it is 0.252 for the Combined Portfolio, i.e. the
Combined Portfolio is about 2 times more heterogeneous that the Old Spenders, for identical
total numbers of participants. This is consistent with our earlier observation that the breakeven
costs in the Combined Portfolio are about twice those in the Old Spenders. Similarly, the above
statistic is 1.799 for the Young Spenders, suggesting that the Combined Portfolio is about 7
times less heterogeneous than the Young Spenders, for the same total number of participants.
Again, this is consistent with our earlier observation about the corresponding breakeven costs.
The three portfolios that we have studied are of moderate heterogeneity and so, although
there are diﬀerences in the breakeven costs for each portfolio, in absolute terms these diﬀerences
are not signiﬁcant. But consider the impact on one of these portfolios of the addition of a
small group of high-wealth individuals. The above statistic (24) suggests that they would
increase the heterogeneity of the portfolio considerably, and hence increase the breakeven costs.The annuity overlay fund 33
The consequence may be a decline in the attractiveness of the resulting annuity overlay fund
compared to the mortality–linked fund.
6 Summary
We have described the theoretical operation of the proposed annuity overlay fund on an instan-
taneous basis. The actuarial fairness of the fund at all instants in time makes it a highly ﬂexible
and adaptable product.
The features of the proposed annuity overlay fund can be summarized as follows.
• Costs can be categorized and each charged separately to the participants.
• Survivors in the fund beneﬁt from participation in the fund, by gaining a nonnegative return
on their wealth.
• Participants are free to invest their wealth in a ﬁnancial market as they individually choose,
with no restrictions on their investment strategy.
• As the longevity risk is borne by the participants of the fund, the annuity overlay fund
should have lower costs than products in which the insurer is responsible for longevity risk.
The participants do not pay the insurer, and indirectly the reinsurer and other ﬁnancial
institutions, to hedge and manage their longevity risk.
• The annuity overlay fund works for any group of participants regardless of their individual
wealth, mortality and investment strategy.
• The number of participants and the wealth-mortality proﬁle of those participants is critical
in determining the expected value and volatility of the payments from the notional mortality
account.
• Participants can exit the fund whenever they choose without paying a ﬁnancial penalty, unlike
conventional life annuities10.
10In practice, it is likely that conditions would be placed on exiting the fund. For example, a participant must
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• The mortality law used to allocate the money in the notional mortality account among the
participants can reﬂect the mortality of each participant individually. This means that we
can allow for participants of diﬀerent socio-economic status, professions and demographics,
all within the same portfolio.
• The mortality law used to allocate the money in the notional mortality account among the
participants can be updated regularly. Thus we can allow for longevity improvements and
other variations in mortality.
We have highlighted the impact of the wealth-mortality proﬁle on the expected value and
volatility of the return on wealth. The low breakeven costs in the numerical simulations suggest
that individuals may be willing to accept the volatility in the actuarial gains.
7 Conclusion
We have contributed to the management of retirement wealth with a new product that recon-
siders annuities and their classical longevity protection scheme. We have introduced an unusual
annuity fund that works for any heterogeneous group of participants and we have provided new
results on the way these funds can be compared to some annuity schemes.
In particular, the metholodogy and the new type of fund that we have presented are inno-
vative in several aspects:
(i) Participants can join an annuity fund and do not need to purchase a share. However their
wealth plays a role in reallocating mortality credit. This is crucial, because the principle of
accumulating a number of shares by the same person implies that shares are not independent:
when that person dies, all their shares are released simultaneously.
(ii) The underlying assumptions on the force of mortality can be updated and personalized to
match each individual participant’s demographic and socio-economic status, as well as their
lifestyle habits.
(iii) We have studied the role played by the number of participants in the proposed fund. Our
initial intuition was that, in order to be competitive versus a fund with no mortality volatility,The annuity overlay fund 35
a pooled annuity fund would need thousands of participants. On the contrary, we found that
the pooled fund needs only a moderate number of participants. As the pooled fund can avoid
the regulatory, prudential and administration costs of a mortality-linked fund, in which the
insurer guarantees a credit proportional to a mortality reference index, it should be more
cost-eﬃcient to the customers than a mortality-linked fund.
We have assumed in the paper that there is no longevity risk. However, it is clear that the
fund shares longevity risk among the participants, in contrast to life annuities which transfer
it to the insurer. Although this should result in lower costs and thus higher expected returns
for the participants, further work is required to analyze the trade-oﬀ between the guaranteed
life income stream from an annuity and the income stream from the annuity overlay fund, in
the more realistic scenario of stochastic ﬁnancial market parameters and stochastic mortality
models.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Fix an arbitrary individual i in the kth group. The Poisson process N
k,i
t indicates whether
the chosen individual i is alive or dead at time t. By the properties of the Poisson process, this
means
E
 
dN
k,i
t
   Ft−
 
= λk
t 1
 
N
k,i
t− = 0
 
dt, (25)
in which 1[A] denotes the zero-one indicator function of the set A ⊂ Ω.
Next, conditional on the information available at time t−, the expected amount of money
in the notional mortality account over the time interval (t−,t) is
E
 
dUt
   Ft−
 
=
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m=1
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t Lm
t−dt. (26)
Writing the instantaneous actuarial gains dG
k,i
t given by (7) in the compact form
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we use equation (25) and equation (26) to show that the expected instantaneous actuarial gains
are zero:
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Proof of Proposition 3.2:
As
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and, excluding the individual i from possible deaths in the kth group,
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it follows that
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Proof of Proposition 4.1:
As
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and, excluding individual i from deaths in the kth group,
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it follows that
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